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Abstract: Although first coined by then United States President Ronald Reagan in
response to state-sponsored terrorism, the "War on Terrorism" has irrevocably evolved
since 1 1 September 2001. Concerned with annihilating the terrorist threats both abroad
and at home, deeper questions of the war on terrorism are unanswered. What does it
mean for the state to win or lose against terrorists? Conversely, what does it mean for
terrorists to win or lose against the state? More precisely, what do the outcomes of armed
conflict mean and look like within the context ofthe war on terrorism? Current terrorism
studies literature focuses on what it takes for the state to win. Yet, scholars fall short

of conceptualizing the alternative. This paper is a humble attempt to engage with the
gaps in current research. Analyzing broader questions of constructivism, discourse and
language, this paper grapples with contemporary theories of terrorism to put forth three
claims. First, terrorism is a social construct whereby discourse is instrumental. Second,
perceptions of victory rely on terrorists'capacity to deal destruction. Third, for terrorists,

to lose is to be forced to

victory and loss for states is
largely indefinable, both measures became distorted. The reason for this is intuitive:
what makes terrorism distinct from other forms of political violence is that the tactic
cease the campaign. Although

requires interpretation by its audience. Adopting a Foucauldian notion of discourse as the

production of knowledge and power, this paper posits that the stakes of the far-reaching
"War on Terrorism" were defined and intensified by the heads of state. The consequence
of which was that the war became

matter of preserving liberal-democratic values rather
than addressing terrorists' motivations.
a
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What does it mean for a state to lose to terrorism? Little to no research in the
terrorism studies literature explicitly grapples with this question. Perhaps the lack of
attention to the concept is a familiar consequence of limited firsthand experience and
fieldwork. The objective of this paper is to consider and analyze the notions of failure and
victory in "The War on Terrorism." In other words, the attempt to understand loss and
success is deliberately abstract and holds no intention to go beyond an exercise of critical
thinking. Within this context, I explore the notions of state victory and terrorists' loss.
Since the subject is more restricted in a notably confined field, my underlying logic is
simple: loss is diametrically opposed to success; to understand loss is to view it through
the framework of success. That is, to lose is the polar opposite of to win. This paper
argues flrst that terrorism is a social construct advanced through discourse. Second, this

paper argues that since the war on terrorism is socially constructed, victory for the state
is predicated upon the inability of terrorists to execute mass destruction. Just as well, for

terrorists, to lose is even temporarily, to be forced to end the campaign. The conclusion
suggests state loss in the war on terrorism is indefinite, but the stakes of losing the war
are exaggerated.

Defining'terrorism' and'war'
One of the many hallmarks of terrorism studies is the issue of defining terrorism
and defining who or what can be or commit terrorism. The claims and justifications
for the sake of labeling and not labeling are diverse and contested. For instance, after
accepting the United States State Department's definition of terrorism in his article,
Robert Pape says that accepting a broad definition of terrorism that includes a national
govemment "would distract from what policy makers would most like to know: 'ohow to
combat the threat posed by subnational groups to state security."' On the other end of the
spectrum," in her article, Ruth Blakeley suggests in support for the view that states can

commit terrorism that "critically oriented scholars need to reclaim the term 'terrorism'
and use it as an analyical tool rather than in the service of elite power.""' This paper
isn't concerned with engaging in or adding a new dimension into this debate. Instead
this paper adopts the definition of terrorism provided by the United States Department
of Defense: "the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to
inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit
of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological objectives.""

Equally as important as establishing a definition of terrorism, I define war as
the declaration of, or state of, armed conflict among states and/or subnational groups.
Explicit mention of armed conflict goes hand in hand with the threat of violence in that
the declaration entails premeditation. In the following section, I briefly contextualize the
war on terrorism and argue terrorism itself can best be understood as a social construct.
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Constructivism and terrorism
Then United States President, Ronald Reagan, coined the war on terror in
reference to conflicts of state-sponsored terrorism. However, the notion of a war on
terrorism wasn't popularized until former President George W. Bush's speech before
a joint session of congress on 20 September 200l The war on terrorism is an ongoing,
international military campaign that was declared in response to the l l September 2001
terrorist attacks. The objectives of the war can best be described as delivering wholesale
destruction to terrorist organizations; eliminating the circumstances whereby terrorists
can reemerge, and protecting the citizens and the interests of the US and her allies. Yet,

the deeper question the objectives beg is who or what is the war against? To be more
precise, is the war on terrorism centered on al-Qaeda and its affiliates or the tactic itself?
The perception of exactly who or what the US and her allies are in war against receives

different interpretations. For instance, in May 2013, President Barack Obama stated that
"The 'Global War on Terror'is oveE the military and intelligence agencies will not wage
war against a tactic but will instead focus on a specific group of nefworks determined to
destroy the US."'Contrastingly, scholars such as Michel Chossudovsky, outright claim
that the focus of the war is on Islamic terrorists: "Osama bin Laden, supported by his
various henchmen, constifutes America's post-Cold war bogeyman, who 'threatens
Western democracy.' The alleged threat of 'Islamic terrorists,' permeates the entire
US national security doctrine."" The point here is that the war on terrorism "does not
separate a war against terrorists from a war against terrorism, as a social phenomenon.rruii
The lack of a distinction made between a war on tactics as opposed to a war on a diffuse
set of individuals and networks has two interrelated impacts: it allows more

flexibility of

the war on terrorism's social construction and shapes the perception of what victory and
defeat looks like in the war on terrorism for both the US and her allies and the terrorists.

Terrorism is a social construct. That is, the understanding of terrorism is built
"through social processes in which meanings are negotiated, consensus formed, and
contestation is possible.,viii The phenomenon "is not a 'given'in the real world; instead it is
an interpretation of events and their presumed causes."to This means that communicating
about terrorism, regardless of the intentionality behind the interpretations, becomes "a
medium by which the negotiation and construction of meaning takes place.", Moreover,

in explaining the evolution of the word, terrorist's meaning- from a positive connotation
during the French Revolution and struggles for emancipation throughout the twentieth
centuiy, to its status as a pejorative term

today- Bruce Hoffrnan

demonstrates that the

current, modern understanding of terrorism is subjective and conditional.',If terrorism is
socially constructed, how does the development ofmeaning take place? The understanding

of terrorism is built through discourse. Terrorism's meaning is fundamentally determined
by the communication that takes place among its targets.
Rainer Htilsse and Alexander Spencer speak to this point in critiquing terrorism
studies' preoccupation with the terrorist actor: "one scholar reproduces the unverified
views of another and thus contributes to the circulation... of interpretations of how others

24
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have interpreted al Qaeda members' self-interpretation.""'Which "overlooks that selfrepresentations only become relevant as they become the object of interpretations in
the Western discoulss.r:;riii For Michel Foucault, discourse was "a group of statements
which provide a language for talking about a particular topic at a particular historical

moment.",'' Discourse can work to define and build the perceptions of objects and
events; it "is about the production of knowledge through language."- Since terrorism
is used to create certain effects on its targets, whereby "terrorizing" can take place, then
terrorism is reliant on the inter-subjectivities of its audience- their sensibilities towards
and analyses of the events. For all these reasons, the Western discourse on the war on
terrorism is instrumental in the social construction of terrorism itself. That is to say that,

in a Foucauldian sense, whether or not the discourse is true, the power in its production
of knowledge makes it so the discourse becomes true.'"'In other words, despite the ffue
identity of terrorists, interpretation and discourse make it so "if we think they are and act
on that 'knowledge,'they in effect become terrorists because we treat them as such."-'"
To develop this argument fi.uther, I briefly evaluate the impact of race in violent crime.
Speciflcally, I look to the possibility that the impact of race makes it so that events, that
are terrorism by definition (even in its loose sense), are treated differently. To be precise,

I

compare the treatment of the 2015 shooting in Charleston, NC as opposed to the terrorist
attack in San Bernardino, CA of the same year. The pu{pose behind this is to demonstrate

how perpetrators have limited agency in defining their actions. Instead, the subsequent
discourse influences the meaning of the action.
The former was a racially motivated shooting at a black church during an evening
bible study on 10 June 2015. The latter was an attack fueled by extreme Islamic ideologt
at a social services center on 2 December 2015. For the former, the perpetrator Dylann
Roof shot and killed nine churchgoers in a confessedly premeditated act intended for the

potitical purpose of strikingfear and creating a roce war.n-iii Although the shooting was
terrorism by deflnition, according to the Department of Justice, the act was investigated
as a hate crime.'to For the lalter, the perpetrators Syed Farook and Tashfeen Halik left
fourteen killed and twenty-two injured in their raid of the social services center. The act
was reportedty inspired by foreign terrorist groups and, according to the Federal Bureau

of Investigation (FBI), investigated as terrorism.
Roof, a Caucasian male, since his incarceration, has been defended by the media
as "being troubled" and "[showing] all the signs of severe and worsening mental illness"
in reference to his struggle staying in school and subsequent drug use, whereas the
U.S.-born Muslim, Farook, and his Pakistani wife, Halik,were killed hours later.o They
reportedly "fappeared] to exempliff this brand

of 'homegrown' or

'self-radicalized'

terrorist.""'The difference in the language used to describe both violent events presents
how agency can be limited in discourse. Despite the confessed aims by Roof, which
would correctly label him a terrorist, his intentions and agency in his actions were
restricted through the eventual discourse that followed. His identity was constructed as
a 'troubled'hate crime-commiffer. In contrast, the personal characteristics of Farook and
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Halik, more than likely influenced their immediate deaths and the avoidance of labeling
either or both perpetrators mentally ill. As a result, although their self-reported objectives
are unknown, their personal characteristics afforded them no sympathy or attempt of
understanding. In other words, the discourse in tandem with their appearance limited
their ability to construct an identity and meaning to their actions. Both the difference of
discourse in the events of Charleston and San Bernardino, accompanied by much of the
recent literature on media bias in white and minority crime are evidence of race's impact

in interpretations.o'j
Another strong example of discourse's instrumentality in social construction is the
rhetoric of former President Bush. As I will show, he rendered a political struggle a
matter of "good" versus "evil". At his speech before a joint session of congress, Bush
said that (emphasis added):
On September the

llth,

enemies offreedom committed an act of war against

our country. Americans have known wars - but for the past 136 years, they
have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in lg4l Americans
have known the casualties of war - but not at the center of a great city on a
peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise affacks - but never before
on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day

- and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under
afiack.**iii
Bush put forth three ideas in his speech that constructed for his audience, an identity
to al Qaeda, the appropriate response to the event, and the meaning of the attack itself.
Recognize that Bush defines the perpetrators as 'enemies of freedom.'The impact

here lies in the implication: terrorists pose a harm beyond American citizens, they are
an affront to our liberal-democratic principles. In saying then, that the terrorists are
enemies of freedom, Bush expands their identity. He constructs their selflrood by placing
them in intimate opposition to the value of freedom itself. In this sense, terrorists are
dehumanized. They become the 'other' to more than the American people; they are
otherized to any person that values freedom. Bush's declaration that 'freedom itself is
under attack' extends the conflict. Again, by way of implication, his speech raises the
stakes and propagates fear. 'Under attack'implies a continuation of assaults on the value

of freedom. In defining the terrorist attacks as freedom being under attack, Bush extends
the war's temporaliff. He implies that more assaults to freedom can and will happen.
This illustrates a Manichean world where the US and her allies are the sole protectors of
the "right" values. His discourse was instrumental in advancing the social construction

of terrorism in building the identity of the terrorists as "evil-doers" who are personally
in opposition to freedom.*'i'Next, in saying that the terrorists executed 'an act of war,'
Bush maintains the construction of the terrorists'identity, and preconditions the U.S. to
retaliate. He renders war a morally legitimate response in putting the terrorists in conflict
with freedom. For the US, a war response becomes a responsibility, because the value of
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freedom is a cause worthy of uniting citizens for the sake ofthe greater good.'- The point
here is that Bush served a crucial role in shaping the construction ofthe terrorists'identity

and overstated the stakes of loss.

For Bush, the meaning of the war against terrorism is not to simply bear extensive
collateral damage, or to concede to territorial losses-it means a spiritual struggle. US
discourse on terrorism usually "[e]vokes images ofmenacing nomadic armies attempting

to conquer 'Christian Europe' and 'good'versus 'evil,'a formulation which is [d]eeply
embedded in American rhetorical traditions and religious life,"'o'i Bush's speech was
no different. Although it has been argued that political discourse that makes appeals to
religion is for the sake of garnering legitimacy and support,'o'" in this respect, Bush upped
the ante ofthe war. That is, in framing this struggle, he built a dichotomy. This dichotomy
provides insight into the meaning of the war on terrorism. In his words, "freedom and
fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral
between

them."*"iIn this sentence Bush is implying that God is on the Western states'

side in the war on terrorism. Because for him, the mission to oppose terrorism at every
turn was "a mission from God.""to If the political struggle against terrorism is a spiritual

struggle, then the meaning of the war against terrorism is to triumph over the values
evil.* I explain this through relating the war on terrorism to George Lakoffs concept

of
of

war's "fairy tale asymmetry."
For Lakoff, in order for a war to be justified, it is necessary to distribute the
archetypal roles of hero, villain and victim. In his view, this narrative constructs an air
of legitimacy throughout the conduct of war that "[{lunctions to justiff... [to a higher
extent] all the extensive powers reserved for wartime."xtri The narrative's hero is always
honorable and selflessly makes sacrifices. Whereas the villain is inherently evil and
displays the witlingness to commit violence against the innocenl.sxii In the US'narrative
on terrorism, as has been shown, the "hero" (the US and her allies) represents all that

is good is against the "villain" (terrorists) who represents all that is bad. The point here
is that, through discourse, Bush overstated the meaning of the war on terrorism, which
enabled it to take on values and a struggle it didn't represent. In other words, my analysis
of Bush's discourse on the war on terrorism demonstrates that "deflning the threats facing
a society is never an objective process, but is rather a highly charged and politicized
process of 'reality' construction through the deployment of language."o'"'

I

discuss what victory looks like for the US and what loss looks like for
terrorists. I do not discuss what victory for terrorists looks like or what loss for the state
can be defined as, because as stated in the introduction, neither are the chief concern of
this paper. For simplicity, I adopt the definition of victory as the realization of notions
Here,

or aims defined by the actors engaged in the conflict. For terrorists, to lose is, even
temporarily, a forced end to the terrorist campaign. The justification for this definition is
provided after I explain the notions of US victory.

Perceptions of victory
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On 23 May 2013 at the National Defense University, President Obama, in the
conclusion of his speech, said that "Our victory against terrorism won't be measured in a
surrender ceremony at a battleship, or a statue being pulled to the ground," he continued,

"Victory will be measured in parents taking their kids to school; immigrants coming to
our shores; fans taking in a ballgame; a veteran starting a business; a bustling city street;
a citizen shouting her concerns at a President.t:r*iv ps1 Obama, victory against the war
on terrorism is the return to normalcy. Public comfort, following the mass panic that the

notion of terrorism brings, then, becomes a metric of success.
The significance of feeling secure reemerges throughout speeches from the leaders

of the federal govemment to terrorism studies scholars.*- Even in the recent terrorist
attacks in Paris, the conception and the importance of returning to normal fueled social

activity:

"It

was the most typical

of Parisian scenes- the sharing of drinks

among

friends. But after the worst terrorist assault on France in recent history it was also meant
to be an act of deflance, a modern-day symbol of "la rdsistance."xnfiAs one of the French
citizens explained,

"I can't say that we're not afraid... But compared with

the terror and

repression that the Islamic State represents... We are as free as the air. Their acts make us

will never give up our freedoms."*,I,'ii Similarly,
Cronin explains that "'winning' is the glaring need to build psychological resilience
even more determined to show that we

among the American people, so that they are less subject to being manipulated by threats

of attacks.)'xxxviii Furthermore, "Americans must stop living on adrenaline and build

a

sustainable future by ending this war and developing some concept of what normality

means."*'' In these comparable interpretations of victory success means supplanting
mass hysteria with the feeling of sanctuary. However, the public's comfort is not borne
simply through time alone. Instead, the sentiment, and thus, the perception of victory is
earned through action.

As Janis Angstrom points out, under the presidency of George W. Bush, the
measurements of success in the war on terrorism were predicated upon military
success. That is, the conceptions of victory were based in the gradual destruction of the

adversary's military and will. As she notes, in the war on terrorism, Bush's metrics were
"casualt5r flgures, control of territory frequency of terrorist attacks, spread of weapons

of mass destruction, and spread of democracy."'t In a Clausewitzian sense then, the Bush
administration's notion of victory was comprised of the destruction of military power,
"reduced to such a state as not to be able to prosecute the War," and the dissolution of
the enemy's morale.*/'Even by these measurements, victory in the war against terrorism

is a matter of public sentiment, albeit almost exclusively through military force within
this context. That is not to say that military action is the answer. Rather that is to say that
tactics that mitigate the terrorist threat make the perception of victory conceivable.

This is because the means to the end of the terrorist threat that result in less attacks
lead to an increased feeling of public safety and security.As mentioned throughout this
paper thus far, terrorism "is employed to produce certain effects on a specific set ofpeople

in order to attain an objective or policy."'/" That said, when terrorists begin to fail, victory
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appears upon the horizon. However, these notions prove problematic. Public comfort is
an indicator of the state's success. After all, indifference is diametrically opposed to fear.

Yet, the fact that the sentiment must be realized through the proof of terrorist capabilities

deterioration implies contingency. To be more precise, the perception of victory is less
concerned with the state's capacity to preserve freedom, and more concerned with

terrorists' lessening capacity for destruction. To this end I define terrorists' loss in the
war on terrorism as, even temporarily, the forced end to their campaign. This is because
the measurements of US victory in the war on terrorism are determined by returning to
a state of normalcy and terrorists' capacity for further destruction. Both of which are a
direct result of the lessening of terrorists'ability to perform another attack. Just as well,
for terrorists, victory can only be more or less realized. Because the current terrorists''i"'
goals are untenable, terrorists cannot experience complete victory and are more likely to
become destabilized.

Modem, religious terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and its affiliates establish
ultimate goals that are impossible to attain, For example, in Inside Terrorism, Bruce
Hoffrnan quotes a Shi'a theologian, Aaytollah Baqer al-Sadr, "We have two choices:
either to accept fthe world others shaped] with submission, which means letting Islam
die, or to destroy it, so that we can construct the world Islam Requires.'\rliu Jssl as well,
the improbable objectives of the leader of the cult, Aum Shinrikyo, are of use here:
"Ashara believed that he had been ordained an... ancient 'light Bod,' and given the divine
task of establishing the 'Kingdom of Shambhala'- a utopian community populated only
by those who had achieved psychic powers."'i'This is not to disparage any religion.
Rather it is to say that objectives such as destroying and reconstructing the world or
establishing a utopian community exclusive to psychics, are very unlikely. The goals
are far-reaching and fanciful at best and bizarre and impossible at worst. However, this

is the case for solely ideology-driven terrorist groups. Compared to ethno-nationalist
terrorists who sought after self-determination, religious terrorist groups in general, and
al Qaeda in particular seem preconditioned to never experience complete victory. For
nationalist groups the aims were plausible and many times successful: "subsequently all
anticolonial terrorists sought to interest the UN in their struggles. The new states admitted
to the UN were nearly always former colonial territories, and they gave the anticolonial
sentiment in that body more strucfure, focus, and opportunities."'/" For religious terrorist
groups though, within their pursuit of grandiose aims, they become more susceptible to

destabilization.

ofvictory forthe US to the impossible goals ofreligious
terrorists, the latter inadvertently creates a pathway to success for the former. As I will
present shortly, destabilization is an ever-present risk for terrorists. The implication of
To connect the perceptions

which is that enough destabilization results in the forced end of a terrorist campaign. If a
condition of victory for the US is terrorists'incapacity for destruction and thus, the return
to normalcy for US citizens, then the forced end of a terrorist campaign is victory. In this
sense then, the campaign's end means loss

for the terrorists. In sum, the goals of terrorists
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create the circumstances for terrorists to lose in the war on terror. The question here is,
what can cause destabilization?

Goal changing can precipitate the defeat of terrorist groups in the war on terrorism.
This is because, although changing goals is a common practice, it threatens the popular
support of terrorist groups. The changes can represent emerging needs or perhaps newly
recognized intermediary goals needed to pursue the ultimate objective. In either case, the
fact that religious terrorist groups'aims are implausible does not make them invulnerable

to shifting goals. In fact, religious terrorists are more vulnerable to failing through goal
changing since the group is more akin to a movement than an organization.
On one hand, a movement is groups of people working together to pursue their
shared social, political, economic goals. Social movements vary but have the tendency
of being large, informal pseudo-structures. On the other hand, a terrorist organization
is an organized group of people who each hold particular goals relevant to a campuign,

which is a series of operations intended to achieve a goal. As detailed by Cronin in
"HowAl Qaeda Ends," the organization is comprised of a core group, traditional groups
that are formally and informally aligned, localized factions and militants who are not
directly associated with al Qaeda, but are purported to be.'/'i'Another component of the
terrorist organization, the network, is a paragon of the relationship between political
violence and technology. The impact of al Qaeda being a movement in terms of goal
changing is that cyberspace affords ample opportunities for recruitment, frurdraising,
and coordination of attacks that effectively reconstructed terrorl511.x/viii With improved
capabilities, members of terrorist groups are now spread throughout the globe carrying
out attacks and providing financial support for the sake of the movement.*/to According
to Cronin "al Qaeda is uniquely able to use existing social networks to mobilize global
supporters and transform sympathizers into violent activists."/ Since al Qaeda and its
affiliates operate within a "lack of central authority and rule-guided interaction implies
that decision-making and coordination in networks tend to be based on consensus and
mufual adjustment rather than administrative fiat,"tigoal changing can easily result in
losing connection with its constituency. Unpopularity of objectives can cause supporters
to drift from the cause, unpopularif of actions too can lessen terrorists' support base.
Excessively violent acts can be incompatible with the sensibilities of supporters resulting
in public revulsion.l" This is because "a terrorist group may choose a target that a wide
range of its constituents considers illegitimate, undercutting the group and transfeoi.rg
popular support to the goverrment's response.''"' The point here is that, in the war on
terrorism, in a sense, terrorists can be self-defeating. The implication is that the US and
her allies have a greater probability of being successful in the war.

Conclusion
In this paper, I first argued that terrorism is a social construction advanced through
discourse. To substantiate my argument,

I discussed the nature of terrorism, its purposes

and its subsequent treatment. For its treatment, I demonstrated the ways in which discourse
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fuels the social construction of terrorism through first comparing and contrasting the
Charleston shooting and the terrorist attack in San Bemardino. Second, I argued that
Bush's speech on 20 September 2001 too, provided meaning, albeit hyperbolic, for the
violent actions. My second argument focused on the perceptions of victory and loss in
the war on terrorism. I linked measurements of US success in the war on terrorism to the
capabilities of terrorist actors. In doing so, I argued that the US'perception of victory is

inextricably tied to the longevity of terrorist campaigns. Third, I argued that the evolution
of terrorists, their strucfures and their aims, make it so that modern, religious terrorists
cannot experience complete success. Overall, however, the conceptions of victory and
failure in the war on terrorism are distinct, yet familiar. War against terrorists is naturally
different. Even in the outcomes of this analysis, the fact of the matter is that victory
and loss are not written out and not agreed upon: "The United States cannot win a war

with al Qaeda the usual means by which wars end- negotiated conclusions- are not
available in this ease."/i'Instead, winning and losing in the war on terrorism are a matter
of perceptions, interpretations, and sentiment.
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